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Pub lic Opin ion and Mass Sen ti ments in
Rus sia and Ukraine: Be fore and Af ter the
Fi nan cial Cri sis of Au gust, 1998*
When peo ple call Rus sia and Ukraine ‘brother re pub lics’, it is not only 
due to their past hyp o crit i cal ide ol ogy, which un der stood broth er hood
as a to tally law less ex is tence for all mem bers of the USSR. The com mon
‘so cial ge no type’, which was in her ited by in de pend ent Ukraine and Rus -
sia, still de ter mines some com mon fea tures of their sim i lar so cial pa -
thol o gies. Com mon tra di tions con cern ing the in ter pre ta tion of so cial re -
al ity and ideo log i cal ste reo types of re cent times lead to some prin ci ple
sim i lar ity of emo tional re ac tions re lated to an eval u a tion of these coun -
tries’ sit u a tions. Nu mer ous stud ies, con ducted in Rus sia and Ukraine,
show that, in both states, the fol low ing sen ti ments have be come pop u -
lar: treat ing au thor i ties and po lit i cal in sti tu tions with dis trust, a pes si -
mis tic at ti tude to the pos si ble over com ing of socio-eco nomic prob lems,
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the phe nom e non of ‘sub jec tive im pov er ish ment’, and a sceptical at ti -
tude to the lib eral strat egy of econ omy trans for ma tions [1]. At the same
time, we can not deny the dif fer ences be tween Rus sia and Ukraine which
pre vent one from re gard ing both states as siamese sib lings, sep a rated by 
force due to their des tiny or ‘evil dem o crat-sur geons’. The ways of Rus sia 
and Ukraine are es sen tially in many as pects, not only in for eign and
home pol i cies but in mass con scious ness, in the thoughts and es ti ma -
tions of peo ple, their ideas about so cial, po lit i cal and eco nomic sit u a -
tions in their own coun try and in the coun tries of their near neigh bours.
In the re search, the re sults of which are pre sented in this ar ti cle, we
con sid ered the as pects of a com par a tive anal y sis of Rus sia and Ukraine
(their com mon fea tures and dis tinc tions in es ti ma tions by pop u la tion
about sit u a tions in so ci ety and their own socio-eco nomic con di tions) on
the eve of the Au gust events, which caused one more so cial shock in
post-So viet Rus sia and es sen tially af fected the sit u a tion in Ukraine. In
the ar ti cle, we have used the data of com par a tive so cio log i cal re search
con ducted by the All-Rus sian Cen tre of Pub lic Opin ion Re search
(ARCPOR) (N=2407) in Rus sia and by the In sti tute of So ci ol ogy of the
NAS of Ukraine to gether with SOCIS-Gal lup com pany (N=1810) in
Ukraine. Also, all na tional pub lic opin ion polls were car ried out in May
1998 in ac cor dance with the programme de vel oped by the ARCPOR and
re lated to the monthly mon i tor ing of pub lic opin ion. Some of the ques -
tions, for mu lated by re search fel lows of the ARCPOR, were in cluded in
the ques tion naire of yearly mon i tor ing con ducted by the In sti tute of So -
ci ol ogy of the NAS of Ukraine.
1. Eval u a tion of the po lit i cal sit u a tion and at ti tudes
to wards so cial pro test: from pre ven tive pes si mism to
de clar a tive pro test
While mak ing as sess ments about po lit i cal sit u a tions in their own
coun tries, Rus sian and Ukrai nian peo ple have ex pressed the same at ti -
tude to wards the ten den cies that pre vail in po lit i cal life: both rarely ac -
cept the sit u a tion as happy and quiet, most of them think that it is tense,
in fact they of ten eval u ate it as crit i cal and ex plo sive (see Ta ble 1).
Peo ple in Ukraine as sessed the po lit i cal sit u a tion in their own coun -
try to be ex plo sive twice as of ten as they did when mak ing as sess ments
about Rus sia (in ter est ing that the ‘burst’ hap pened not where it was ex -
pected). At the same time, in both coun tries, the ma jor ity of the pop u la -
tion said the sit u a tion was ‘tense’ be cause, as far as their feel ings are
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con cerned, it was the most typ i cal fea ture of the po lit i cal sit u a tion. This
as pect could be seen in self-anal y sis about their moods, where ten sion
and an noy ance pre vailed (see Ta ble 2).
Ta ble 1
As sess ments of po lit i cal sit u a tion in Rus sia and Ukraine, % 
How do you eval u ate the po lit i cal 
sit u a tion in the coun try as a
whole?
Ukrai ni ans
about
Rus sia
Ukrai ni ans
about
Ukraine
Rus sians
about
Rus sia
Happy  1.0  0.9  0.6
Quiet  6.7  8.2  6.7
Tense 52.6 50.3 57.0
Crit i cal, ex plo sive 16.4 33.9 27.2
No re sponse 23.3  6.6  8.9
Ta ble 2
How the an swers were dis trib uted in re sponse to the ques tion:
«What would you say was your mood dur ing the past days?», %
Ukraine Rus sia
Won der ful mood  2.3  4.0
Nor mal, bal anced 26.5 35.6
I feel tensed, an noyed 48.2 43.3
I feel scared, de pressed 12.8 11.6
No re sponse 10.3  5.5
How ever, al though peo ple were emo tion ally ready for the fact that
trans for ma tions for the better were some way off, they did not ex pect the
sharp fall in the econ omy. Only 19% of Rus sians as sumed the pos si bil ity 
of a sharp de te ri o ra tion in the eco nomic sit u a tion for forth com ing
months, 17% as sumed the same in the po lit i cal sit u a tion.
Nat u rally, fore casts and es ti mates made by or di nary peo ple about po -
lit i cal and eco nomic shocks co in cide with real po lit i cal life more of ten
than prog no ses by po lit i cal sci en tists and econ o mists, but they re flect
gen eral emo tional sen ti ments that could be es sen tial if the po lit i cal sit u -
a tion in a coun try was to change sharply. The mass feel ing of an ‘in -
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flamed’ po lit i cal en vi ron ment, com mon for Rus sia and Ukraine, en ables
the ma jor ity of peo ple to per ceive so cial shocks as quite an ap pro pri ate
stage of so ci ety’s de vel op ment and do not re spond to them too dra mat i -
cally. At the same time, Ukrai ni ans ap peared to be more pre pared for the
worst cir cum stances than Rus sians. To be gin with, on the eve of the cri -
sis, they said their mood was ‘nor mal’ not as fre quently as Rus sians (see
Ta ble 2), sec ondly, among Ukrai ni ans, there were less op ti mists than in
Rus sia, who be lieved that life would come right in the coun try within the
year (11% against 15%). But the main thing is that, in both coun tries, a
large ma jor ity of the pop u la tion were pes si mists.
Mass pes si mism, which sub sti tuted the op ti mism of So viet peo ple,
plays an im por tant so cial role un der the con di tions of un fore seen po lit i -
cal, so cial and eco nomic de vel op ment of so ci ety. It makes it pos si ble to
keep a dis tance from the failed il lu sions that lost their reg u la tive char ac -
ter af ter the com mu nist pseudo-pa ter nal is tic ide ol ogy lost its dom i -
nance in so ci ety. It might ex plain why the ‘post-Au gust’ events, which
pro foundly af fected the eco nomic in ter ests of Rus sians and Ukrai ni ans,
did not cause a rise in pro test ac tiv ity.
Sep a rate pro test ac tions, re lat ing to de lays of sal ary pay ments in
Ukraine, and the trade-un ion dem on stra tions in Rus sia on Oc to ber 7,
1998 can hardly be re garded as ad e quate pub lic re ac tion to the slump in
the econ omy, the fast growth in prices and sharp fall in liv ing stan dards.
Al though al most a third of Rus sian and Ukrai nian cit i zens con sid ered
mass ac tions against low er ing stan dards of liv ing to be ex pected where
they lived, those who did not wait for pub lic pro test ac tions, held by their
coun try men, ap peared to be more pre scient (see Ta ble 3).
Ta ble 3
Es ti ma tion of the prob a bil ity of pub lic pro test ac tions, %
How do you es ti mate the pos si bil ity of pub lic
ac tions against the de te ri o rat ing stan dard of
liv ing, to de fend your in ter ests in your town,
vil lage or re gion now?
Ukraine Rus sia
Quite pos si ble 37.0 43.2
Un likely 40.1 40.2
No re sponse 22.9 16.6
In Ukraine, the per cent age of those who ex pected pub lic pro test was
al most equal to the per cent age of those who were ready to take part in
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these ac tions, whereas the Rus sian pop u la tion ex pected pub lic pro test
ac tion more than Ukrai ni ans, but the num ber of Rus sians ready to take
part in these ac tions was sig nif i cantly less (see Ta ble 4).
Ta ble 4
Readi ness to per sonal par tic i pa tion in pro test ac tions, %
If meet ings and pro test dem on stra tions were held, 
would you per son ally take part in them? Ukraine Rus sia
Rather yes 35.2 27.1
Rather no 35.4 53.5
No re sponse 29.4 19.4
We would like to em pha size the prin ci ple sim i lar ity of at ti tudes to -
wards pro test for most of the pop u la tion in Ukraine and Rus sia: most
peo ple do not de clare any clearly ex pressed in ten tion to par tic i pate in
pub lic ac tions. So, the po ten tial of ‘peo ple’s pa tience’ is still not ex -
hausted by au thor ity up to the crit i cal level de spite nu mer ous un suc -
cess ful eco nomic ex per i ments that de te ri o rate the so cial and eco nomic
sit u a tion.
 2. The ‘Bear ing Un bear able Hard ships’ Phe nom e non: 
in Ukraine, al ready on the eve of the cri sis,
the ma jor ity of the pop u la tion could not
put up with such con di tions which
the ma jor ity of Rus sian peo ple
can not stand only af ter
the cri sis
Taking into ac count the dom i nance of peo ple who do not want to take
part in pro test ac tions against the de te ri o rat ing stan dard of liv ing in
Rus sia and Ukraine, a nat u ral ques tion fol lows: what level can be re -
garded as crit i cal, when a mass pro test turns from a hy po thet i cal fac tor
of so cial in sta bil ity into a real one threat en ing so cial up heaval? We can
as sume that it de pends on an in abil ity to hence forth bear an ab ject pov -
erty. Let us look at the dis tri bu tion of an swers to the ques tion: To what
ex tent are the cur rent con di tions for Rus sians and Ukrai ni ans un bear -
able? (see Ta ble 5).
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Ta ble 5
How the an swers were dis trib uted in re sponse to the ques tion:
«Which one of the fol low ing state ments cor re spond to the cur rent
con di tions in the best way?», %
 Ukraine Rus sia
It is not so bad, one can live  4.1  9.7
Life is hard, but one can bear it 30.6 41.6
It is im pos si ble to bear our ab ject pov erty 59.9 42.0
No re sponse  5.4  6.8
We can see that, in May 1998, three out of five cit i zens in Ukraine con -
sid ered their sit u a tion to be poor enough to be un bear able. In Rus sia,
the same sen ti ments were ex pressed only by a mi nor ity. How ever, in Rus -
sia, pro test ac tions were more ac tive. In some re gions, they even turned
into col lec tive hun ger-strikes and ‘rail wars’. So, we should not re gard
the sit u a tion, when most of the pop u la tion in a post-So viet coun try con -
sider their sit u a tion to be com pletely un bear able, as crit i cal. The ‘Bear -
ing Un bear able Hard ships’ phe nom e non could be seen af ter the events
of Au gust in Rus sia too. Ac cord ing to data from a poll con ducted in Sep -
tem ber 1998 as part of the ARCPOR mon i tor ing, 61% of Rus sians
thought that it was im pos si ble to suf fer their pov erty. Among Ukrai nian
peo ple, in Sep tem ber 1998, the same in dex reached 54% (ac cord ing to
data from a na tional pub lic opin ion poll held by the Kyiv In ter na tional
In sti tute of So ci ol ogy). So, Rus sians re acted to the eco nomic shock by
‘dis tress alert’ and were ahead of Ukrai ni ans as far as an in dex of ‘a sub -
jec tive un bear able poor sit u a tion’ was concerned. How ever, just af ter
Rus sia changed its gov ern ment and Rus sian re form ers lost their mon e -
tary am bi tions, the ‘suf fer ing and mis er a ble’ ma jor ity seemed agreed
with the vague pros pects of go ing out of the dead end of eco nomic cri sis.
In May 1998, Rus sians had more rea son for feel ing they had a better
sit u a tion than Ukrai ni ans. At least the stan dard of liv ing of the av er age
Rus sian were much better. For in stance, in Rus sia, per ca pita fam ily in -
come (its USD equiv a lent value) was 2.1 times higher than that in
Ukraine (ac cord ing to poll ing data, in Rus sia, it was 78 USD, whereas in
Ukraine, it was 37 USD). How ever, just one fi nan cial shock was enough
to de te ri o rate the emo tional sit u a tion in Rus sia, and peo ple’s moods be -
came worse than the mood of Ukrai ni ans dur ing the May poll. For ex am -
ple, in Sep tem ber, the pro por tion of Rus sians who felt tense and an noyed 
grew to 48%, and the sec tion of those feel ing scared and de pressed grew
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to 20%. One could hardly ex pect any other re ac tion, when tak ing into ac -
count the fact that well-be ing and peo ple’s moods are di rectly con nected
with the ac tual sit u a tion found in a coun try. How ever, the se ri ous
change in mood of the Rus sian pop u la tion did not af fect their readi ness
to pro test which was a gen eral in dex of peo ple’s un will ing ness to bear
the cur rent con di tions.
So, we can state that, in post-So viet coun tries, even 60% of cit i zens,
liv ing in un bear able con di tions, can not be re garded as the up per limit
which threat ens the safety of ex ist ing so cial or der and in ef fi cient gov ern -
ment. Prob a bly, such a limit does not ex ist at all. The only way out might
be when ‘in ac ces si ble re spon dents’ (pres i dents, min is ters, peo ple’s dep -
u ties, etc.), who are the real source of so cial shocks, be gin to con sider
their con di tions of liv ing un bear able. How ever, to day they stand their
con di tions more sto i cally than the ma jor ity of the pop u la tion. At least,
the Pres i dents of Rus sia and Ukraine do not make pub lic com plaints
about the un bear able liv ing con di tions, though or di nary cit i zens per -
ceive their ac tiv i ties, re lat ing to the cur rent so cial sit u a tion, in a bad
light. Such neg a tive as sess ments of all branches of au thor ity are very
pop u lar in Ukraine and in Rus sia. Ac cord ing to data from the May poll,
when eval u at ing the ac tiv i ties of their Pres i dents on a 10-point scale,
Ukrai nian and Rus sian peo ple marked them not higher than three
points.
3. One pos si ble source of so cial and eco nomic shocks
in post-So viet states: when mod er ate de mands
be come ex ces sive
Peo ple usu ally look for the source of eco nomic cri ses in the wrong
eco nomic pol i cies and in the in ef fi cient ac tions of au thor i ties. There is
no rea son to ar gue with this ap proach. Not only qual i fied ex perts but or -
di nary cit i zens ac cuse state lead ers of such cri ses.
For in stance, in Ukraine, the pop u la tion think that the main rea son
for eco nomic de te ri o ra tion is in ef fi cient state lead er ship. Rat ings of trust
in the Pres i dent, gov ern ment and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have per -
sis tently dropped since the last elec tion and the ap point ment of a new
Prime Min is ter. In May 1998, com plete trust in the Pres i dent of Ukraine
was men tioned by only 3% of peo ple, com plete trust in the gov ern ment
and Verkhovna Rada was men tioned by 2% for both; L.Kuchma’s ac tiv ity 
(in 1998) was es ti mated as quite ac cept able by less than 2% of pop u la -
tion (cf.: 10% in 1994). In Rus sia, peo ple’s trust in B.Yeltsin, the Pres i -
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dent, has per sis tently dropped from a very high rate (at re-elec tion time)
to al most zero af ter the Au gust events. It seems we could hardly re fer to
any other rea sons of eco nomic cri sis, ex cept in ef fi cient state lead er ship,
if peo ple not only very pa tiently bear all the hard ships of the tran si tional
pe riod but also bring very low ma te rial de mands (see Ta ble 6).
Ta ble 6
Com par a tive es ti mates of per ca pita in come and ma te rial de mands of
Rus sians and Ukrai ni ans
Ques tion Ukraine (USD)
Rus sia
(USD)
Cor re la tion
of in comes
and de mands
(times)
1. What was the av er age in come (per per -
son) in your fam ily last month?  37  78 2.1
2. What monthly in come (per per son)
could pro vide a liv ing wage now a days?   94 147 1.6
3. How much money (per per son) does a
fam ily need to live nor mally, in your
 opinion?
179 296 1.7
4. What av er age monthly in come (per per -
son) could mean that the fam ily is poor?   41  79 1.9
5. What is the low est av er age monthly in -
come (per per son) which could mean that
the fam ily is rich?
761 1261 1.7
To day’s de mands of the Rus sian and Ukrai nian pop u la tions can be
re garded as pretty mod er ate not only in com par i son with the stan dard of
liv ing in de vel oped west ern coun tries but with cor re spond ing in di ces
that were in the USSR be fore its end ing (see Ta ble 7 [2]). 
Ac cord ing to the data, Rus sians and Ukrai ni ans now wish to have (to
lead a nor mal life) less than they (ac cord ing to of fi cial sta tis tics) had in
1990. How ever, the cur rent mod est de mands were formed in a so cial and
eco nomic en vi ron ment which dif fers from the one of the for mer USSR.
While ex ten sive eco nomic de vel op ment is com ing to its end and an in ten -
sive stage is far from be ing started, even mod est ma te rial de mands can
be come ex ces sive for a tran si tional econ omy. No won der that all coun -
tries which have ex pe ri enced even weaker eco nomic shocks started with
strong con sumer dis ci pline and la bour in ten si fi ca tion.
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Ta ble 7
In ter na tional com par i son of gross na tional prod uct (GNP)
and gross in ner prod uct (GIP) per ca pita in 1990 
Coun try GNP per ca pita(USD)
GIP per ca pita
(on a par with pur -
chas ing power of USD)
Rus sian Fed er a tion  3430  7968
Ukrai nian Re pub lic  2500  5433
So cial ist coun tries of East ern
Eu rope and the USSR  2670  6100
Coun tries of mid dle in come  2350  4830
In dus trial de vel oped coun tries 14580 14440
De veloping coun tries   810  2170
Ac cord ing to the poll ing data ob tained in May 1998, in Ukraine, per
ca pita in come was twice as less than the same in come in Rus sia (37 USD 
and 78 USD re spec tively, though Rus sians as well as Ukrai ni ans per -
ceive con di tions in their coun tries as pov erty); it means that Ukrai ni ans
es ti mated their liv ing wage, nor mal con di tions and rich life up to 1.6-1.7
times lower than Rus sians did. Are the cur rent de mands of Rus sians
rea son able, if their neigh bors, who had the same start ing po si tion in
1990, now have much more mod est de mands?
In the times of the for mer USSR, in spite of less gross na tional prod uct 
per ca pita in Ukraine than in the Rus sian Fed er a tion, Ukrai nian lev els of 
con sump tion per ca pita (con cern ing ba sic food stuffs) ex ceeded the av er -
age in di ces. In 1990, the Ukrai nian in dex of peo ple’s life ex pec tancy ex -
ceeded the av er age in di ces cal cu lated for the USSR and for the Rus sian
Fed er a tion (71.0 and 69.3 years re spec tively).
As part of the USSR, Ukraine was tra di tion ally re garded as a rel a tively 
suc cess ful So viet re pub lic, if not as a wealthy. Con cern ing the fol low ing
in di ces of eco nomic po ten tial — pro duc tion of steel, cast-iron, coal,
sugar, but ter and etc. per ca pita — Ukraine was in first place not only in
the USSR but also in Eu rope. Its corn pro duc tion rate met the Eu ro pean
stan dards. As to one of the main, in ter na tion ally rec og nized, in te gral in -
di ces of the qual ity of life — the In dex of Hu man De vel op ment (IHD) —
Ukraine was among the top thirty in dus tri ally de vel oped coun tries in the 
world.
Pub lic Opin ion and Mass Sen ti ments in Rus sia and Ukraine...
Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 1998–1999 39
Taking into ac count the above-men tioned fac tors and the com mon
cul tural and his tor i cal pre con di tions of Rus sian and Ukrai nian de vel op -
ment as sov er eign states, we can con clude that af ter the USSR was ru -
ined, both coun tries had ap prox i mately iden ti cal ini tial po si tions as far
as their de clared de vel op ment goals are con cerned: a dem o cratic state
and a mar ket econ omy. Per haps in Rus sia, a smarter eco nomic start,
due to eco nomic lib er al iza tion, and higher world prices for fuel (the main 
Rus sian ex port re source) made for their higher stan dard of liv ing and
higher ma te rial de mands. How ever, the fa vour able fac tors of the first
years were lost, while the de mands re mained. In or der to meet them un -
der less fa vor able con di tions, the Rus sian gov ern ment be gan to con -
struct an enor mous state fi nan cial pyr a mid, which, of course, ru ined
many Rus sians and left them with an un pleas ant choice be fore them: to
scale down their de mands to the same bare level as found in Ukraine,
and, un der these cir cum stances, go on with re form ex per i ments or, on
mar ket ‘ru ins’, to try to re new an ad min is tra tive econ omy sim i lar to the
‘Belarus sce nario’. Rus sia has not still made a clear choice. Ukraine,
which has al ready con structed its own fi nan cial pyr a mid (not as high as
its neigh bors did on their de mands), man aged to get agree ments with its
cred i tors and avoid any scan dal ous eco nomic crash. How ever, Ukraine
did not man age to avoid a slump in the value of its na tional cur rency and
a rise in the rate of in fla tion (though they were not as steep as hap pened
in Rus sia). The mod er ate ‘post-So viet’ de mands, the av er age shock, and
the higher de mands, the more se ri ous shock. Is it right!? Let us hope
that this rule is not a his tor i cal law.
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